

Key Recovery Attacks of Practical Complexity on AES Variants

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Current State of Affairs in Cryptanalysis

Time complexity of a related-key attack:

“Thus, the total time complexity of Step 2(b) is about $2^{256} \cdot 2^{167.0} = 2^{423.0}$ SHACAL-1 encryptions.”

- ▶ Most cryptanalytic papers discuss certification attacks.

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- ▶ Most cryptanalytic papers discuss certificational attacks.
- ▶ These attacks are of great importance, but they do not help answering questions by users:
 - 1 Does this attack affect my system?
 - 2 Should I still use AES-256 for encryption?
 - 3 MD5 is still OK for certificates, right?

What a Break is?


- ▶ There are several approaches towards what constitutes a certificational break.
- ▶ One approach: $\max(\text{Time}, \text{Data}, \text{Memory})$ less than Exhaustive search' time.
- ▶ Another approach: $(\text{Time}, \text{Data}, \text{Memory})$ better then generic attacks.

A New Metric

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Leonard Bernstein

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**Lev Davidovich Bronstein
(Leon Trotsky)**


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


Daniel J. Bernstein


Time Complexity of Attacks on AES-256




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
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
Time Complexity of Attacks on AES-256




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


Time Complexity of Attacks on AES-256




Key Schedule Algorithm of AES-256

Our results are based on the fact that key difference



leads to the 10 subkey differences



With probability 1!

Attacks

Rounds	Scenario	Time	Data	Memory	Result
8	Key Diff. – CP	2^{31}	2^{31}	2	Distinguisher
8	Subkey Diff. – CC	$2^{26.5}$	$2^{26.5}$	$2^{26.5}$	35 subkey bits
9	Key Diff. – CP	2^{39}	2^{38}	2^{32}	Full key
9	Subkey Diff. – CC	2^{32}	2^{32}	2^{32}	56 key bits
10	Subkey Diff. – CP	2^{49}	2^{48}	2^{33}	Distinguisher
10	Subkey Diff. – CC	2^{45}	2^{44}	2^{33}	35 subkey bits

Security Implications

- ▶ Extending AES-128 key to 256 bits actually reduces security!
- ▶ The security margins are smaller than expected.

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- ▶ This is a good time to check that Serpent-support. . .




Conclusions

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Questions?

Thank you for your attention!

The paper is available on eprint
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