

# SHA-1 Differentials for Boomerang Attack

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# Collision Attacks

- High probability differential
  - nonlinear differential in round 1
  - low cost disturbance vector (linear differential in rounds 2-4)
- Fast message generation
  - message modification (advanced)
  - neutral bits
  - tunnels
  - boomerang attack

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Attack complexity depends on all factors!

# Path with 7 auxiliaries

$i$	$A_i$	$W_i$
-4	.....	
-3	.....	
-2	.....	
-1	.v.lv...v.vv...v.lv...1...0	
0	0..1.....1.....0..v1	..---t...q.mj...g.da...+..
1	++.+v+t..v.qvvmj1lv.gvnda.1..+.0	+ē---+q̄.m̄j...ḡ.dā.....--..
2	---+1.-.01...1..11...1+-11...0	..-...u...r.nk...h.eb.+...0
3	00-.00u00..r.0nk00+-h.0eb00.+1.0	.ū-...-r̄.ēn̄k̄..q̄.hm̄jēb̄..ḡ.dā+--..
4	---01.00...0+.00..000..00.001.	---+...ē...q̄.m̄j...ḡ.dā+...-
5	0..-10v+0+v0v01v00vv100..000101-	...++...ē...q̄.m̄j...ḡ.dā...-
6	-0.110.000.0.00.00.....01110-+	++.....ū...r̄.n̄k̄..h̄.ēb̄-...-
7	0--..1-+++++.....-----	-...-...ū...r̄.n̄k̄..h̄.ēb̄--+...-
8	0+001...1011000000000000.0...011	..+.-+.....+...-
9	+++11...000000000000001.1v01110	-.++-+.....-+...-
10	0-0.1...0..00...0..00...+.1+-	-.++..w...s.pl...i.fc.-...-
11	1++10.w...s.pl...i.fc...+-++	.w̄...s̄.p̄l̄...ī.f̄c̄...++...-
12	+0.00...0...0..00...0..00.v101	+...+++.....-...-
13	+--100...0...0..00...0..00..011	...-.....-+...-
14	+.-0.....-+	..+...w̄...s̄.p̄l̄...ī.f̄c̄+...-
15	-0+00.....0v	...+...w̄...s̄.p̄l̄...ī.f̄c̄+...-
16	-00.0.....0.	..+...+.....+...-
17	+--1.....	..+...+.....-+...-
18	..001.....	..+...+.....+...-
19	..-.....	..+...+.....+...-
20	.....+.	..+...+.....+...-

